Declines in desired fertility could help explain why the male-biased sex ratio has worsened in many countries as they have developed. Suppose a couple strongly wants at least one son. They are less likely to naturally have a son the fewer children they have, so a preference for a smaller family could increase their use of sex-selective abortion. This paper quantifies the relationship between desired fertility and the sex ratio, focusing on India. It does so by eliciting sex composition preferences at specified levels of total fertility. I find that the desired sex ratio increases sharply as the fertility rate falls, and that fertility decline can explain 30-50% of India's sex ratio increase over the past thirty years. I also show that female education could counterintuitively worsen the sex ratio because while it reduces the desired sex ratio at any given family size, it also reduces desired family size.
Introduction
In India and several other countries with son preference, the male-biased sex ratio has worsened over the past several decades despite gains for women and girls along other dimensions such as educational attainment and decision-making power in the household (Kishor and Gupta, 2009) . One reason is the increased availability of prenatal sex-diagnostic technology, which has made sex-selective abortions possible. Another less obvious possible reason is the decline in desired family size. Suppose a couple strongly wants to have at least one son. If they wish to have six children, there is only a 1% chance they will be without a son, but if they wish to have only two children, there is a 24% chance. 1 Because they are less likely to have a son by chance the fewer children they have, as their desired family size decreases, the likelihood that they manipulate the sex of their children (through sex-selective abortion, infanticide, or neglect) might increase.
The time trends in many parts of the world are consistent with this idea that the desired number of children has fallen faster than the desired number of sons, putting upward pressure on the sex ratio. 2 Figure 1 shows that the total fertility rate in India has been declining since 1960, while the sex ratio has been rising. 3 Previous scholars have conjectured that falling fertility could help explain time trends in the sex ratio in South Asia (Das Gupta and Bhat, 1997; Basu, 1999) , East Asia (Park and Cho, 1995) , and the Caucasus region (Guilmoto, 2009 ). These previous papers do not test the conjecture, however, and other factors could account for the sex ratio trends, such as falling costs of sex-selective abortions or an upward trend in son preference. 4, 5 This paper's contribution is to directly estimate the causal relationship between family size and the desired sex ratio and to quantify one important cause of rising sex ratios. The challenge in estimating this effect is to isolate exogenous variation in the total fertility level.
The approach I use is to elicit sex composition preferences at different fertility levels: A hypothetical total fertility is specified to the survey respondent, and she is asked, given that total fertility, what is her preferred composition of boys and girls. 6 By imposing the total number of children, one can characterize the respondents' sex ratio preferences at different exogenously determined fertility levels.
The questions were fielded to men and women in Haryana, a state in north India. The survey sample comprises parents of adolescents. The fertility-preference questions asked the respondents about the fertility outcomes they desired for their adolescent child rather than themselves, thus avoiding the problems associated with retrospective questions.
Haryana has the most male-biased sex ratio in India, with a child sex ratio (0 to 6-yearolds) of 1.20 based on the 2011 Census. However, Haryana appears to be typical of north India in terms of the desire to have sons, as shown in Appendix Table 1 . 7 Where it differs is that fertility is lower than in the rest of the region. This paper's thesis is that Haryana's low fertility and high sex ratio are connected: Due to its low fertility, son preference translates into a worse sex ratio here than elsewhere. Thus, Haryana may be a harbinger of how the sex ratio will evolve in the rest of north India as fertility falls.
These facts illustrate an important distinction between son preference and how that preference manifests itself in the sex ratio. Families have both a preferred number of sons at any given fertility level (which I call son preference) and a preferred fertility level (family size preference). According to the hypothesis of this paper, holding son preference fixed, the desired ratio of sons to daughters will change when family size preference changes. Specifically, if son preference is characterized by a strong desire to have at least one son, then the desired sex ratio will increase when the preferred family size decreases.
This distinction between son preference and how it manifests in the sex ratio is not just specific to India. Appendix Figure 1 shows that among low-and middle-income countries, higher GDP per capita is associated with a weaker desire to have more sons than daughters yet a more male-skewed sex ratio. Economic development appears to mitigate son preference but not the problem of missing girls. Meanwhile, desired fertility falls sharply with GDP per 6 To prevent respondents from anchoring on their first answer, each respondent was asked the sex composition question for only one, randomly chosen, fertility level. 7 Appendix Table 1 compares Haryana to the other "Hindi belt" states in north India using India's most recent DHS, called the National Family Health Survey (NFHS). Haryana is wealthier than the other Hindi belt states, as measured by electrification, access to piped water, average education, and a broad-based wealth index. Actual and desired fertility are lower in Haryana. Son preference, measured as the proportion who want more sons than daughters or the gender gap in schooling, is similar (slightly lower) in Haryana. capita. 8 What the figure also shows is that India is not a large outlier in terms of wanting more sons than daughters, but it is in terms of its low desired fertility and its high sex ratio.
Thus, both the worldwide patterns and the ways in which India is anomalous are consistent with the ideas put forth in this paper.
Using the fertility preference data collected in Haryana, I find that the desired sex ratio increases sharply as the fertility rate falls. When the family size specified to the respondent is 3 children, the desired sex ratio is 1.12, while with 2 children, it rises to 1.20. Interestingly, between 1981 and 2011, the actual child sex ratio in Haryana rose from 1.12 to 1.20, while desired fertility fell from 2.83 to 2.11. 9 When the hypothetical family size falls to 1, the vast majority of people want a son, and the desired sex ratio rises to 5.64. Meanwhile, for family sizes larger than 3, respondents actually prefer to have slightly more daughters than sons.
These data suggest that son preference is characterized by a strong desire to have at least one son and a preference for gender balance thereafter. In other words, the desire to have an eldest son is a key feature of fertility preferences. Favoritism toward eldest sons is well-documented in India and has been attributed to the patrilineal and patrilocal kinship system (Dyson and Moore, 1983; Das Gupta, 1987) and the Hindu requirement that only a male heir can light the funeral pyre (Arnold et al., 1998) . If the lower labor market potential of women or the need to pay dowries loomed large, then the desired number of sons would likely look more homothetic in family size.
Next, I use the data to estimate how much of the recent sex ratio trend in India is due to fertility decline. My first approach combines the fertility preference data with data on desired fertility. The second approach postulates that son preference takes the form of strongly wanting at least one son and being otherwise indifferent about child gender, a form of preferences suggested by the data. These estimates suggest that 30-50% of the increase in the sex ratio over the past thirty years can be accounted for by the shift toward smaller family sizes.
Finally, I examine how female education affects the sex ratio. Rather than holding son preference fixed as the earlier analyses did, I allow it to also change, with the goal of illustrating the offsetting effects that progressive forces have on the sex ratio. On the one 8 The data are from DHS surveys of ever-married women age 15 to 49. All three univariate relationships are statistically significant at the 5% level. The magnitude of the negative relationship between GDP per capita and wanting more sons than daughters might be underestimated because, as shown later, wanting more sons than daughters is more common when family size is smaller (so when GDP per capita is higher). 9 Desired fertility is calculated from NFHS, as described in section 3.3.
hand, female education leads to weaker son preference, that is, a desire for fewer sons at any given family size. On the other hand, it leads to a decline in desired fertility-which, as I have argued, will lead to a higher desired sex ratio, all else equal. Thus, combined, it is ambiguous how increased female education, and progressive forces more generally, will affect the desired sex ratio. I show that for female education, the two offsetting forces cancel out;
the net effect on the desired sex ratio is essentially zero with the point estimate suggesting that, if anything, this modernizing force, counterintuitively, causes individuals to want a more male-skewed sex composition of children.
This paper contributes to the literature on son preference and the determinants of the sex ratio. Several papers provide suggestive evidence on the link between fertility levels and the sex ratio, but few papers directly estimate the effect. Bhat and Zavier (2003) analyze the standard DHS fertility preference question that asks the respondent simultaneously for her desired family size and the sex composition of those children, and find that those who want a smaller family size want a lower proportion of boys. However, estimating the fertilitysex ratio relationship from the cross-sectional variation will give biased estimates if there is a systematic correlation between an individual's desired family size and degree of son preference. Intuitively, we might expect that those with more traditional values want larger families and also have stronger son preference (and, indeed, my data show that such a correlation exists). Ebenstein (2010) uses cross-region variation in fines for having extra children to show that the One Child Policy in China led to a more skewed sex ratio. The concern with interpreting his estimate as causal is that the level of fines might be related to the degree of son preference in the region. Anukriti (2014) analyzes a program in Haryana, India, that rewarded parents if they had either fewer children or a larger fraction girls: The highest payout was for having one girl (and then becoming sterilized) and a smaller payout was given for having either just one boy or two girls. She finds that the policy reduced fertility and led to a more male-skewed sex ratio. Because the policy simultaneously incentivized low fertility and a less male-skewed sex ratio, the analysis likely underestimates the effect of fertility on the sex ratio. 10 10 A 1997 Gallup poll asked respondents in several countries the preferred gender if they were to have one child (Gallup Organization, 1997) . In India, 40% of respondents preferred a boy, 27% preferred a girl, and the remainder had no opinion. This level of son preference is smaller than in my sample (and in fact similar to level of son preference in Gallup's US sample). Information that might shed light on why the results differ, such as their survey methods or sample characteristics, are not published. Portner (2014) estimates a model of fertility in India, using the sex of births and length of birth spacing to infer abortion. He finds that educated and urban women use sex-selective abortions more, which he speculates is due to their lower 2 Data
Sample
The data for the analysis were collected between September 2013 and January 2014 as part of a baseline survey conducted to evaluate a secondary-school-based gender sensitization program in Haryana, India. The four study districts-Jhajjar, Panipat, Rohtak, and Sonipat-are adjacent to New Delhi and have lower fertility and a more skewed sex ratio than average for Haryana.
Many of the particular features of the sampling strategy were for the purpose of the program evaluation, such as a maximum of one school per village to minimize spillovers and oversampling grade 6 girls for whom we expect the largest program impacts. The sampling strategy was, first, to select 314 government secondary schools (from among the roughly 350 in the 4 districts), excluding schools with low enrollment or high attrition between grades 6 to 8 and including at most one school per village. Second, within these schools, on average 45 students were selected to be interviewed; since in some schools, there were fewer than 45 students eligible to be surveyed, in other schools, the sample size was higher. Grade 6 girls comprise 33.3% of the sample, and grade 6 boys, grade 7 girls, and grade 7 boys each comprise 22.2% of the sample. 11
Then, for a random 40% of the surveyed students, one of their parents was surveyed; the reason for surveying only a subset of parents was a budgetary constraint. For this subsample, surveyors visited the household, and either the mother or father was randomly chosen to be surveyed. If the parent was not home or available to be interviewed during the three attempts the survey team made, a replacement household was randomly chosen. In total, attempts were made to interview 3587 mothers and 3503 fathers, with a survey completion rate of 89.6% for mothers and 70.2% for fathers. The lower rate for fathers is not surprising as men were more likely away from home working when the survey was conducted. The final sample comprises 3215 mothers and 2460 fathers. 12 desired fertility. In his review article on son preference and the sex ratio, Bongaarts (2013) also discusses the link between desired fertility and the sex ratio.
11 For a student to be eligible for the survey, a parent needed to provide informed consent and the student needed to provide informed assent to be surveyed. The surveys of students were conducted in the schools.
12 An additional 701 households were interviewed in which the child lived with only one parent. Because some of the analysis will compare results for mothers and fathers and it would not have been possible to randomly select which parent to interview in cases where the child lives with one parent, the analysis is restricted to parents of students who live with both parents. The results are nearly identical when including Descriptive statistics for the sample are presented in Table 1 . Female respondents are 35 years old on average, and male respondents, 40 years old. The illiteracy rate is 39% among females and 16% among males. The sample is 95% Hindu, and about 18% of respondents belong to a scheduled caste. The average number of children the respondents have is 3.5 and the percent sons among their children is 54%. 13
Elicitation of fertility preferences
The survey asked prospective questions about the fertility of the adult respondent's child (or the child's future wife). The purpose of asking prospective rather than retrospective questions about the respondent's own fertility, as is done in the DHS, was to avoid restrospection bias (Westoff and Ryder, 1977; Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993) . These forward-looking questions are relevant when projecting future fertility patterns as long as parents' preferences influence their children's fertility. 14 Importantly, the survey questions differ from the standard ones in that a total fertility level is specified, and the parent simply gives the gender mix: "Suppose your son/daughter [the specific grade 6 or 7 child we surveyed] was going to have N children, how many of them would you want to be boys and how many would you want to be girls?" 15 In principle, each respondent could have been asked about several values of N but to avoid anchoring, each parent was asked the question for only one value of N randomly chosen, with equal likelihood, from the integers between 1 and 5. Given the randomized design, cross-person comparisons should accurately measure within-person preferences at different fertility levels.
Appendix Table 2 compares the subsamples assigned different values of N . 16
The standard DHS fertility question was also asked (about the respondent's child), in which the respondent specified both the desired number and sex composition: "How many the additional 701 respondents and are available from the author.
13 Percent sons is calculated excluding the sampled student; because the sampling frame includes more girls than boys, percent sons is mechanically lower (51%) if the sample student is included. Two percent of parents have a missing value for the percent sons variable because they have only one child.
14 For the first 22% of students surveyed, the desired fertility questions were also included in the student survey, referring to the student's future fertility. The Haryana Department of Education then requested that these questions be removed from surveys conducted in schools, as they deemed 11 to 13 years old too young for these questions. For the student subsample asked the questions (3387 respondents), the results are similar to those for parents. There is a negative effect of family size on the percent sons desired; the average percent sons desired is 76% when family size is 1 and declines monotonically to 50% by a family size of 5. 15 The questions do not ask for gender preference by birth order. 16 Characteristics are balanced across the groups, except for a marginal difference in the percent sons among the respondent's children. The empirical results are robust to adjusting for baseline characteristics. children do you want your son/daughter to have? How many of these children would you like to be boys, how many would you like to be girls, and for how many does the gender not matter?" This question was asked before the one that randomly specified total fertility.
The new fertility preference question intentionally does not allow the respondent to state "no opinion"; it elicits the respondent's preferred outcome, rather than a combination of her preferred outcome and the strength of that preference. In contrast, the DHS question allows for indifference. In the latest round of India's DHS, only 25% of north Indians have son preference as measured by the DHS question (see Appendix Table 1 ). It seems unlikely that the majority of north Indians are exactly indifferent about the gender of their children, as the DHS question would suggest. Thus, the goal of disallowing indifference is to elicit the respondent's "bliss point," under the assumption that a negligible fraction of individuals are exactly indifferent. Note that if those who are indifferent about child gender give random answers, then I de facto treat them as indifferent; in the analysis, their preferred sex ratio will be 1, or essentially the natural sex ratio. Of course, behavior (e.g., having a sex-selective abortion) also depends on the strength of preferences and many other factors such as the monetary and non-monetary costs of having a sex-selective abortion and the costs of other options such as going beyond desired fertility to try again for a son. Thus, understanding preferences is very useful for but obviously not sufficient for predicting behavior. Along the horizontal axis are the five randomly assigned specified family sizes (number of children). The vertical axis plots the average percent sons that are desired by parents. (I use percent sons rather than the sex ratio because the sex ratio is undefined at the individual level if there are zero desired daughters.) When the family size is 1, the average is over 80% and declines sharply as family size increases. The lower the family size, the more the desired sex composition is skewed toward sons.
Results

Negative effect of family size on percent sons desired
Because the responses are similar for mothers and fathers (mothers have slightly higher son preference), the rest of the analysis focuses on pooled results for mothers and fathers. Table 2 shows the full distribution of responses. The first column is the subsample asked about a family size of 1. The vast majority of respondents, 84.9%, would want this one child to be a son. The bottom rows of the table aggregate these responses and report the average percent sons desired for the population (84.9%), and the corresponding sex ratio (5.6).
The second column is the subsample asked about a family size of 2. The most common preference is one boy, one girl (84.6% of respondents), with 12.4% preferring two boys and 3.1% preferring two girls. These responses correspond to a desired percent sons of 54.6% and sex ratio of 1.20. For family size of 3, the responses correspond to 52.8% sons, or a sex ratio of 1.12. While the change in percent sons seen between family size 1 and family size 2 is especially large, the changes are meaningful in magnitude at all family sizes: Reducing family size from 3 to 2 increases the desired population sex ratio from 1.12 to 1.20.
The pattern continues as family size increases to 4 and 5: The larger the family size, the lower the desired percent sons. One quite striking result is that the average percent sons is below 50% for family size of 4 and 5. Respondents appear to strongly want to have 1 or 2 sons but then prefer that the additional children are girls. For example, at a family size of 5, 18.1% of respondents have a preference for 4 or more girls, while only 3.3% have a preference for 4 or more boys. The preference for having more daughters than sons when family size is large need not be due to altruism toward girls; parents might want daughters so they can care for siblings and perform household chores. Anecdotally, two reasons parents dislike having many sons are that there is more conflict over splitting the family land and daughters are more docile. Table 3 tests the statistical significance of the negative relationship between family size and the percent sons desired. In an ordinary least squares regression, the percent sons decreases by 8.5 percentage points for every additional child, with a p-value < 0.01. The analysis pools parents' responses about either their son or their daughter (whoever was surveyed for the student sample). The results are very similar for responses about sons and daughters. When the regression reported in Table 3 , column 1, is estimated for the subsample of parents asked about their daughters, the coefficient is -0.086; for the subsample asked about their sons, the coefficient is -0.083.
In column 2, estimating the coefficients separately for each family size, the monotonic decline is statistically significant at the 10% level or lower at each increment. The results are nearly identical adjusting for differences in baseline characteristics (columns 3 and 4). 17
17 It is unlikely that these systematic patterns would arise from respondents being indifferent and giving arbitrary answers when forced to choose. The DHS-type question analyzed below did allow for indifference (to be consistent with the standard DHS question), asking respondents how many of the total desired children As family size grows, the desired percent sons falls sharply. More specifically, to first approximation, families want one son and if that preference is satisfied, want close to an equal number of sons and daughters. These patterns point to the desire for an eldest son as the central feature of son preference. The eldest son plays an important role in the patrilocal kinship system in India through which parents live with their eldest son; Hinduism also decrees that, for salvation, a male heir of the deceased must perform their funeral rites such as lighting the pyre (Dyson and Moore, 1983; Das Gupta, 1987; Arnold et al., 1998) . Table 4 shows that respondents with a preference for a larger family also have stronger son preference. Each row is a subsample that reports a different desired family size when asked the standard DHS question. The modal response is 2 children. 18 Each column is a subsample asked about sex composition for a different randomly-specified family size (which more often than not differed from their desired family size). Each cell reports the average percent sons desired at the randomly-specified family size for the subsample defined by the row and column. First, within rows, the pattern seen earlier is present: The desired proportion sons is higher the smaller the family size is. Second, looking within columns, the desired proportion of sons at each randomly-specified family size is increasing in the desired family size. This implies that son preference and family size preference are positively correlated across individuals. The aggregate pattern is shown in Figure 3 : The average desired percent sons at randomly-specified family sizes-that is, average son preference-is higher among those preferring a larger family size. Appendix Table 3 , columns 1 and 2, show the regression estimates for this relationship. Wanting one extra child is associated with a 6.6 percentage point increase in average percent sons desired.
Correlation of family size preference and son preference
If one uses responses to the standard DHS question and calculates how the desired proportion of sons varies with family size, the pattern differs from the monotonic negative relationship seen earlier in Figure 2 . Percent sons desired at the desired family size is nonthey wanted to be boys, how many they wanted to be girls, and for how many they did not care about gender. The results in Table 3 are nearly identical when one restricts the sample to the 83% of respondents who expressed strict gender preferences over each child's gender in the standard DHS question; the coefficient in column 1 remains -0.085.
18 Because only 9 respondents report a desired family size larger than 4, they are grouped with those desiring a family size of 4. In addition, 10% of respondents are excluded from this analysis because they did not give a numerical answer to the question, either responding "Up to God," responding "Up to spouse/family," saying they did not know, or giving an inconsistent answer in which the number of desired children by gender did not add up to their desired number of children. monotonic in desired family size, as shown in Figure 3 . 19 The pattern reflects the combination of the negative effect of desired family size on the percent sons desired and the fact that individuals who prefer a larger family also have stronger son preference. On average, this relationship is negative; desired percent sons declines by -0.023 with each additional desired child on average (Appendix Table 3 , column 3). However, this effect size is much smaller in magnitude than was seen in Table 3 , column 1 (coefficient of -0.085), where the measure of son preference was independent of the respondent's family size preference. Because of the positive correlation between family size preference and son preference, using the standard fertility question underestimates the negative effect of family size on the desired sex ratio.
This likely explains why previous work using the DHS questions concludes that the sex ratio will become less skewed when desired fertility falls (Bhat and Zavier, 2003) .
How much of the sex ratio trend can fertility decline explain?
The fact that the desired sex ratio increases substantially when family size is smaller suggests the time trend in TFR shown in Figure 1 could be an important cause of the time trend in the sex ratio over the same period. In this subsection, I quantify how much of the time trend in the sex ratio could be explained by falling TFR. Of course, several other factors besides falling TFR also could contribute to changes in the sex ratio; the goal here is to assess whether the contribution of fertility decline is large or small.
Method 1: Using data on desired proportion of sons
As a first approach, I combine the average desired percent sons at different fertility levels shown in Table 2 and annual data on desired total fertility. I construct desired total fertility from India's DHS, called the National Family Health Survey (NFHS). Pooling the three NFHS rounds, I observe women from a large range of birth cohorts and can thus calculate,
year by year, the distribution of desired number of children among women who were age 25 to 34 in that year (i.e., in their prime childbearing years). The average value of desired TFR by year is shown in Figure 4 . 20,21 19 Following the DHS, the individual answered how many of the desired children ideally would be boys, girls, or no gender preference. The no-gender-preference children are counted as 0.5 sons and 0.5 daughters.
20 Actual TFR (shown in Figure 1 ) exceeds desired TFR, both because some families use stopping rules to achieve their desired number of sons and because of incomplete access to contraception. 21 The first NFHS was conducted in 1992 and samples women up to age 49, so I can construct desired TFR based on 25 to 34 year olds only starting in 1977. Thus, I restrict the time period for this exercise to 1981 to 2011. The sex ratio data are from the Census, and 1981 is the first Census year after 1977.
I assume that some fraction θ of the population deviates from the natural sex ratio to attain their desired sex ratio or, equivalently, their desired proportion of boys. I assume that the remainder of the population does not manipulate the gender of their children and has the natural proportion of sons or uses stopping rules to achieve their desired number of sons. 22 I use 1.02 as the natural sex ratio (equivalent to the proportion of sons being 50.74%). 23
For each year from 1981 to 2011, I use the distribution of desired TFR (from the NFHS) and the desired proportion of boys for different levels of TFR (from the Haryana parent survey) to construct the average desired proportion of boys. 24, 25 To determine θ, the fraction of the population that manipulates its sex ratio, I calculate the value of θ that allows one to match the level of the sex ratio in 1981. In other words, there is a unique θ that yields the actual 1981 sex ratio of 1.0395 given the distribution of desired TFR in that year. This value of θ is 0.188, or 18.8% of individuals. I assume this fraction remains fixed over time (as does every other factor such as son preference, access to ultrasound, and costs of sex-selective abortions). I calculate how the sex ratio evolves after 1981 simply due to falling desired TFR. The goal is to determine how much of the trend in the sex ratio between 1981 and 2011 is explained by fertility decline.
The results of this exercise are shown in Figure 4 . The blue line is the projected sex ratio; it is rising over time, though not as much as the actual sex ratio (plotted in gray). The 22 Stopping rules do not affect the population sex ratio because each birth is a random draw at the natural sex ratio; stopping rules do generate a cross-family correlation between family size and the within-family sex ratio (Clark, 2000; Jensen, 2003) . 23 Following the literature, I assume the natural sex ratio at birth in India is the observed value for Sub-Saharan Africa, which is 1.033 (Sen, 1992; Garenne, 2011) . The natural sex ratio for 0 to 6 year olds (the age range for which sex ratio data are available for India) is lower than this because the natural rate of infant and child mortality is higher for boys than girls. The sex ratio of children age five years and younger is 1.017 in Rwanda and 1.021 in Kenya, so I use 1.02 as the best estimate of the natural sex ratio among 0 to 6 year-olds in India (Republic of Kenya, 2009; Goverment of Rwanda, 2009) . 24 If in a certain year 50% of NFHS respondents want 4 children, 30% want 3 children, and 20% want 2 children, then the average percent sons desired would be 0.5 * the sample average percent sons desired at a randomly-specified family size of 4 + 0.3 * the sample average percent sons desired at a family size of 3 + 0.2 * the sample average percent sons desired at a family size of 2. Because the highest family size for which I have fertility preference data is 5, I assume that for desired family size larger than 5, the desired percent sons is the same as it is for a family size of 5. 25 The data on desired TFR and the child sex ratio are for all of India, while the data on desired sex composition are from the sample of parents in Haryana. Using preference data for Haryana could either overstate or understate how much fertility decline has caused the sex ratio to rise for India. While Haryana's level of son preference is higher than average for India (because south India has lower son preference), what is relevant for the projection is the slope, i.e., how fast the desired number of sons falls as desired total fertility falls, and this slope could be higher or lower in Haryana. Also, because θ is set by matching the 1981 sex ratio, when the level of son preference is higher, the proportion of people manipulating child gender is assumed to be lower, and the net effect on the projected trend in the sex ratio is ambiguous.
projected sex ratio matches the trend more closely for the second half of the period. This pattern is consistent with the diffusion of ultrasound being the main driver of the rising sex ratio in the 1980s and early 1990s, and then fertility decline playing a major role in the last decade, once access to ultrasound was widespread; families could more fully optimize with respect to their fertility and gender preferences once they were unconstrained by technology.
Overall, declining fertility leads to an increase in the sex ratio that is 54% of the actual increase in the sex ratio over the 1981 to 2011 period. Undoubtedly, another key factor is the increasing availability of prenatal sex-diagnostics, so it is reassuring that the projection does not explain all (or more than all) of the actual increase in the sex ratio. 26
Method 2: Positing a preference for at least one son
As a second approach, I posit a specific form of son preference, informed by the fertility preference data: People have a strong preference for at least one son and are indifferent about other children's gender if this has-a-son requirement is met. I assume that the only individuals who might resort to sex selection are those who do not have at least one son within their desired total fertility. The advantage of this second approach is that it builds in an asymmetry, which is likely realistic, between those who have more versus fewer boys than their preferred sex composition. The disadvantage relative to the first approach is that it disregards other features of preferences besides the desire for an eldest son, such as the fact that at a family size of 3, one third more people want two sons as two daughters. The second line plotted in Figure 5(a) is the proportion of those without a son within their desired fertility who use sex selection; this inferred rate increases from 4% to 14% between 1981 and 2011.
This inferred rate of sex selection combined with the assumption that only the son-less 26 Other factors affecting the sex ratio that could also have been changing over time include average son preference in the population, the composition of births across women of different son preference, the costs and risks of abortion, and child mortality. use sex-selection provide a second estimate of how much of the time trend in the sex ratio is driven by declining desired fertility. Specifically, I estimate the portion of the sex ratio trend that is not explained by desired fertility by holding fixed the desired fertility distribution from 1981 but allowing the proportion of the son-less who use sex selection to evolve. The unexplained portion quantifies how much of the upward sex ratio trend is caused by the downward fertility trend. Figure 5(b) plots the projected sex ratio were desired fertility to have remained constant, as well as the actual sex ratio. The projected trend is 70% of the actual trend, implying that declining fertility explains 30% of the rising sex ratio. Consistent with the results of the first approach, in the 1980s when prenatal sex diagnostic technology was rapidly diffusing, changing access to sex selection seems to explain most of the sex ratio trend, but over the past twenty years, declining desired fertility has played a larger role.
Net effect of female education on the sex ratio
Thus far, the thought experiment of this paper has been to hold son preference fixed and examine the effects of declining fertility on the sex ratio. In the next and final analysis, I relax this assumption to highlight the dual effects that progressive forces have on the sex ratio. Specifically, I examine the effect of female education. Female education is hypothesized to promote progressive attitudes and influence both son preference and desired fertility.
Previous work has found that maternal education reduces stated son preference (Pande and Astone, 2007) . However, even if female education leads to a desire for fewer sons at any given family size, there is an offsetting effect. Maternal education is also associated with a decline in fertility (Drèze and Murthi, 2001; Osili and Long, 2008; Duflo, Dupas, and Kremer, 2012) . As this paper has argued, a smaller family size leads to a higher desired sex ratio, all else equal. Thus, the net effect of female education on the desired sex ratio is theoretically ambiguous. Table 5 . The results of mother's education requires that, conditional on these control variables, education is uncorrelated with unobserved factors that affect fertility preferences.
Column 1 of Table 5 examines the effect of female education on the percent sons desired at the randomly-specified family size, the unbiased measure of son preference. The categories for educational attainment are completing grade 10 or higher, completing grade 8, and completing primary school with less than primary as the omitted category. The negative coefficients indicate that education reduces women's son preference. Column 5 is similar to column 1 but, for parsimony, uses only a dummy for having finished grade 8 or higher (which 40% of respondents have done). Completing grade 8 reduces the desired proportion sons by 4 percentage points.
Columns 2 and 6 examine the effect of education on desired family size. (In contrast to most previous studies on education and fertility, the outcome here is desired family size for the respondent's child rather than herself.) The outcome is based on the standard DHS-type fertility preference question which elicits the ideal family size. More education is associated with a smaller desired family size.
Columns 3 and 7 recast the negative effect of education on desired family size in terms of the corresponding increase in the desired percent sons. The dependent variable is the sample average percent sons desired corresponding to the respondent's desired family size.
For example, if the respondent's desired family size is 1, then the dependent variable is 0.849, which is the average percent sons desired among those randomly assigned family size of 1, as reported in Table 4 . 28 The negative effect of having a grade 8 education on the desired family size is equivalent to an increase in the desired proportion of boys of 2 percentage points (column 7).
Columns 1 to 3 and columns 5 to 7 show the two offsetting effects: Education reduces son preference at any given family size, which should decrease the desired sex ratio, but it also decreases desired family size, which increases the desired sex ratio. The net effect is shown in columns 4 and 8, where the outcome is the percent sons desired at the desired family size using the standard DHS-type question. The point estimate in column 8 suggests a small positive net effect on the desired proportion sons, i.e., a more male-skewed desired sex ratio, but the coefficient is small and statistically indistinguishable from zero. Here, are nearly identical when instead separate control variables for each of the 36 wealth variables are included.
28 One cannot use the respondent's desired percent sons because each respondent was only asked about one randomly assigned fertility level, which might not correspond to her desired family size. the two opposing effects almost exactly offset each other. This null result is noteworthy: A progressive force like female education need not improve the desired sex ratio.
The contrast between the negative effect of mother's education on son preference using the new measure introduced in this paper and the null effect of mother's education on the desired sex ratio highlights an important methodological point: Using the sex ratio as a measure of son preference can lead to the wrong conclusions.
Conclusion
This paper made both a methodological and substantive contribution related to son preference and skewed sex ratios. The methodological innovation was a survey question that elicited desired sex composition at a randomly determined level of total fertility specified to the respondent. This question generates a measure of son preference that, unlike those based on the standard fertility preference questions, is not biased by the fact that individuals who desire a larger family size tend to have stronger son preference.
A first substantive contribution was to quantify how much declining fertility contributes to the worsening of the male-skewed sex ratio in India. The smaller the family size, the less likely a family is to have a son by chance and more likely, perhaps, to obtain one via sexselective abortions. This paper showed that this effect is quantitatively important: Falling fertility could explain a third to a half of India's sex ratio increase over the past thirty years.
Tracing out how the desired sex composition varies with family size is also revealing about the specific nature of son preference. Families appear to strongly want one son rather than always preferring having a son over a daughter. At a family size of one, the vast majority of respondents want that one child to be a son, but at a family size of two, having one daughter and one son is much more preferred to having two sons. Moreover, at a family size larger than three, respondents prefer to have more daughters than sons. This pattern of son preference suggests that favoritism toward boys is not driven primarily by considerations such as low earning capacity of girls or dowry, which are not diminishing in the number of daughters. The culturally-rooted desire for an eldest son is central to parents' sex-composition preferences.
Another contribution was to show that factors that lead to more progressive attitudes, such as female education, need not improve the sex ratio. While female education reduces the desired sex ratio at any given family size, it also reduces desired family size, so it is not guaranteed to ameliorate the skewed sex ratio. The substantive finding was that mother's education reduces son preference but not the desired sex ratio. The methodological lesson was that using the sex ratio as the measure of son preference would have led to the incorrect conclusion that female education has no effect on son preference.
More broadly, the conceptual point articulated in this paper is that son preference should be thought of as a vector of desired number of sons at different possible fertility levels. The manifestation of son preference in the sex ratio depends on the son preference vector, but also on the desired fertility level. Modernization might shift the son preference curve down, but, as importantly, it will cause movement along the curve by reducing desired fertility.
The joint evolution of son preference and desired total fertility determines how the sex ratio will change over time and in response to different interventions.
One direction for future work is to elicit preferences not only for the "bliss point" of sex composition and total fertility, but also the relative disutility of deviations. For example, at a family size of two, most individuals want one son and one daughter. However, a reasonable guess is that these families would be more inclined to resort to a sex-selective abortion to achieve this preferred sex composition if they naturally had two daughters than if they had two sons; having zero sons is much more undesirable to them than having zero daughters.
Similarly, some families will prefer to try again for a son and use stopping rules rather than sex-selective abortions. Quantifying the asymmetry in how much individuals dislike having more boys versus more girls than their ideal sex composition and how much they dislike going beyond their desired family size would help further characterize son preference and family size preference and how the skewed sex ratio and total fertility will evolve in the future. Notes: The top panel uses the NFHS desired fertility data to calculate the proportion of women who would not have at least one son within their desired TFR. The green line (triangles) shows the time trend in this proportion. The orange line (diamonds) is the inferred proportion of the first group who uses sex selection to obtain a son; it is the proportion that allows one to match the actual child sex ratio data. In the bottom panel, the gray line (triangles) shows the actual child sex ratio. The blue line (diamonds) shows the projected sex ratio holding desired TFR fixed at its 1981 level; the gap between the two lines is the portion of the sex ratio trend that is attributable to declining desired TFR. Notes: Cells in the first 6 rows report the proportion of respondents who want a particular number of sons at the hypothetical randomly-specified family size. The remaining rows report the aggregated average percent sons, corresponding sex ratio and sample size for each randomly-specified family size. Notes: Each row is a subsample defined by the respondent's desired family size for his or her child. The first 5 columns report the average percent sons desired by respondents randomly assigned to different specified family sizes. The sixth column aggregates the data in the first 5 columns and reports the average percent sons at the randomly-specified family size. The seventh column reports the percent sons desired based on responses to the standard DHS-style fertility question where the respondent chooses the desired family size and sex composition simultaneously. 
